Problems for Personalists
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Personalism is not

a

closely

defined

philosophical discipline.

Occasional attempts have been made to achieve a consensus among
personahsts as to what they beheve. But their "platforms" have so
far

provided no precise index to the metaphysics of personalism.
Hence any discussion, especially a critical exposition of personal
ism, is

a

difficult venture. The constant risk is that

one

should find

hunself

dealing with a sport rather than the true vine. Yet it may
be fairly said that the current phase of personalistic thought in
America, exemplified in the philosophy departments of Boston
University and the University of Southern California, owes its basic
principles to the systematic work of Bowne.
I. The Problem

of

Metaphysics

This paper undertakes to set forth three major areas in which
personalism leaves searching questions unanswered, in metaphysics,
in the

philosophy

of

science, and in the theological

area

of the dis

tinction between the natural and the

supernatural.
metaphysics from two ideas and a con
clusion. The two ideas were (1) that only that which acts exists
and (2) that substance, since it is by definition non-active, is non
existent. His conclusion was longer. The problem of change and
identity demands an abiding, enduring reference for the flux of
continual becoming in order that, from the fading panoply, organ
ization sufiicient for experience be achieved. Were there no factor
providing for permanence, no conscious experience would be pos
sible. The uncomprehending commg and going of discrete, com
pletely unrelated items would be the result. Only as there is an
abiding something to bridge from one item to the next can there be
the sort of cumulative acquisition which we term knowledge or ex
perience. Bowne found this need met only in the fundamental
nature of personal self-consciousness. Hence, though things are
merely phenomenal, persons are real.
Now if it be true that the natural order is merely a system of
qualities, how can certain vital metaphysical distinctions be main
Bowne constructed his

achieve any of the distmctions proper to the
various levels of nature? For example, how shall one differentiate
tained? How shall

we
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hving from the non-hving?
organic and inorganic requires
the

The barest distinction between the

something
qualities
of its past as it proceeds
of
cannot do. The issue attendmg a phenomenalistic interpretation
experience is that, with the rejection of substance, there necessarily
that the

organic

sustam

to its future. But this is what

and causation. Bereft of

these, nature
is without dimension and can have no history, for there is nothmg
enduring. Thus, the mmimal conceptual needs of biology cannot be
met. The predisposition of a thmg to develop or to be modified in
one way rather than another and the capacity of a thmg to yield

follows the denial of

essence

notions for

phe
nomenalism. If the cosmos is but a
qualities,
it
is
bom.
then history is lost in its own making, it dies as
History
in
nature.
is possible only if there is something objectively enduring
And the distinction between life and non-life is meaningful only as
history is a material reality.

present evidence of past influence

are

impossible

rootless surface of

It

was

Bowne's conviction that the universe did not

come

to

in the consciousness of persons. (How he
could know that nature was thus wanting, since he knew nothing of
its full

meaning except

things-in-themselves, is a mystery.) By this he meant that the ob
jective order was not an order except as it was organized by per
sonal self-consciousness. That is, the hierarchy of the sciences, with
their supposed reference to the essential gradation of nature, is sub
jective. But, as was shown above, this will not do. Brightman no
ticed the problem as early as 1921.^ Cranston has also shown that
a major endeavor of contemporary personalism is to meet this in
^
adequacy in one way or another. The inherent weakness of person
alism in treating of the metaphysical status and function of nature
tends always to drive it to absolute idealism (panpsychism) or to
reaUsra

(occasionalism). Phenomenalism, to date, is not an ade
quate metaphysical basis for common experience. It ends in a ver
sion of positivism which has, in secular quarters, long since been
given up.
The attempt to round out the phenomenalistic account leads
consistently away from the metaphysics implicit in evangelical the

ology. Thus,
1

Bowne's students have defended much that he denied.

Edgar S. Brightman, "The Tasks Confronting a Personalistic Philoso
phy," Personalist, Vol. II (October, 1921), pp. 257-258.
2 Mildred Welch
Cranston, "Tensions Within Personalism," The Philo
sophical Forum, Vol. IV (Spring 1946), pp. 23-25.
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Bertocci has
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affirmed that "Personalism is pantheistic so far
concerned, for it holds that Nature is God's energiz-

frankly

the world is

ing."3
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After all

if, as personahsm claims, the only reality is personal
then nature, if it has any
metaphysical status whatever, must be
personal. This is merely to go back, as Bowne should have more

consistently done, to Berkeley's doctrme
Nothing in the phenomenahstic scheme can
rule. It matters not at all

�

of "esse est

percipi."

stand exempt from this
and here is the difference between

Berkeley's and Bowne's msight that the reahn of
sidered objective to finite persons. Bowne insisted
�

nature be con

that he

was

in

realist because he

regarded the order of qualities as
external. It was something found, not made. But this does not al
leviate in any degree the threat of pantheism, for though nature be
altogether objective to finite persons it is nevertheless a feature of
some personal experience, if not ours, then God's. This is to
say
that if nature does not exist in its own right as a metaphysical reality
it cannot exist, on personalistic grounds, except as it shares in the
nature or experience of some person. Bowne's adherence to objec
tivism rules out the possibility of identifying nature with finite
persons; hence, it must be identified with God.
some sense a

II. The Problem

of a

Phenomenahsm is

a

Philosophy

surface

thing-in-itself, if
is an illegitimate

Substance

Science

philosophy,

there be

ture of the

of

satisfied that the

such, is beyond

notion of uncritical

causal relation is not found in

This

na

our

thought

grasp.
and the

Hume's famous
experience.
discovery. Restricting experience by definition to our straight
forward interplay with the external order of qualities removes any
hope for realism. What happens to science in this context is ade
quately expressed in Humean skepticism and in the successive va
rieties of positivism which have stemmed from the phenomenahstic
tradition. Moreover, though it is true that Bowne was in complete
disagreement with Hume on certain issues, he is nevertheless impli
cated in much that Hume was able to show as resultmg from his
own

was

denial of substance and causation.
What Hume found

was

that his doctrine necessitated the strict

uncertainty as to the future. After all, if one cannot get beneath
the phenomenal thing to its fundamental nature, there is no knowest

Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God in Late British
Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 115-116.
3

Peter A.
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ing

its necessary

it has
a

a

thing

deportment. Indeed,

there is

no

knowing

whether

of
necessary Ime of behavior at aU. If the essential nature
cannot be grasped, there is no providmg for it a lunitmg

knowledge of the past we
do not and cannot penetrate to the unambiguous, hard core of
reality, we can never have certain knowledge regarding the future.
Thus the strictest science ends in mere probabihty. Experience
knows only that a thing is now colored, figured, textured, etc., and
that these qualities, sometimes modified, sometimes not, succes
sively appear through the intervals of perception. The modification
or its opposite merely happens and there is no possibility of ex
plaining these phenomena. Thus, one state of a thing, however
exceptional, is as appropriate as any other. There is no arbitrating
between conflicting states of qualities (e.g., mirage versus undistorted image) in order to learn which is expressive of the true
nature of the thing. Qualities simply are what they are. They refer
to nothing beyond themselves or, if they do, we cannot infer that
definition. This

means

that, if from

our

reference. The conclusion is that the laws of science
lative in nature. Rather

are, in

are

not regu

another, conveni
ences or conventions of the mind in its handling of experience. (It
is here that the most radical doctrines, e.g., positivism, pragmatism,
operationalism, etc., appear.) Then, if there be no regulative
scheme that

we can

they

one

way

or

discover in nature, there is no telling what the
produce. Perhaps cuckoo eggs will stand forth

might
expound metaphysics. Any absurdity whatever is just as pos
sible as the uniformity we have come to know.
Bowne, at this point, forsook the strict phenomenahsm of
British empiricism and for a very good reason. He realized that the
quahties of things can never reveal their true nature.^ He was aware
of the predicament of Humean phenomenalism and
sought to avoid
it. It is not that he differed m his doctrine of
ontology from that of
He
was
committed
to the notion that
phenomenalism generally.
there is no existence of any kmd underlymg
quahties. But he tried
so to
his
as
to
reach
a
different conclusion. What
arrange
premises
he suggested was that though we know
only qualities we can never
theless perceive a thing's true nature from the law of its
activity.^
next moment

and

This

4

was

Bowne's

Borden P.

1882),pp.
5
Ibid.,

philosophy

of science.

Bowne, Metaphysics (New York: Harper and Brothers,

61ff.
pp. 59ff.
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Baconian

disciphne

of

data. One observes and records and this is science, the
limit of our knowledge of nature.
Seemingly this is adequate as a

cataloging

definition of science

is it not true that

only knowledge of a
thing gained by
empirical encounter, observation of a thing's
the
various
activity through
phases of its career until we have dis
covered the laws of its behavior?
yet actually its madequacy is
is

�

our

the

�

well known. No later than Galileo it

was

found that science is not

spectator disciplme. Data, by themselves, do

not

Data must be

if

understood, intellectualized,
possible. Every

a

constitute science.

systematic

advance

sheer fact is made

modification of nature
beyond
proceeds upon discernment that the desired modification is within
the possible range of a thing's nature. Otherwise science would be
a blind
swinging in the dark hoping to hit upon some fortunate
combination of events so as to produce a desired end. Science is
more than the recording of the states of a
thing as it proceeds
through its own history.
Bowne glimpsed the difiiculty attending his definition. He
realized that certainty, for this sort of science, is possible only in
the presence of an exhaustive knowledge of a thing's actual and
possible history.*^ This is a manifest impossibility. Bowne should
have further reahzed that it amounted to

scription

of science. More

that if the law of

a

especially
thing's activity is

and that if this law

or essence

knowledge

of the

thing

are

his inevitable

then he had

superseded
companions.

III. The Problem

identical with its true nature

or essence

nature at all. He has not

bility

total upset of his de
he ought to have understood

of the

a

no

is found

only

in exhaustive

basis for real

Hume.

knowledge of
Skepticism and proba

Natural-Supernatural

Distinction

merely a version of phe
nomenalism is doomed in the area of metaphysics by its chosen
limitations to the state in which Hume left it. Now a pertinent and
crucial theological question must be raised. If experience yields
nothing but qualities and if these have no necessary connection or
require exhaustive knowledge in order to be known, then every
successive or new state of a thing is as native to the thing as any
Phenomenalism

�

and

personalism

is

�

other. No
7

Ibid.,

one

state is more natural than any other. Each is to be

pp. 74-75.

The Asbury Seminarian

40

accepted as a valid member of the passing parade (Hume) or
subsumed, together with aU other contributing data, under the un
finished history of the thing (Bowne). In either case there is no
point in the development of science where one may stop and con
either

tent hunself with the assurance that he knows the

objects

of

experience.

But if

one

what is natural to them, neither
He cannot know miracle!

real nature of the

know their true nature,
he know what is non-natural.

cannot

can

departure from the norm of a thing's
a radical sample. Miracle is the nonbehavior. It is not
natural, a contradiction of nature which, without the back-drop of
the causal relation, would be indistinguishable. It is no extrava
gance to claim that within the frame-work of phenomenalism,
whether Bowne's variety or other, miracle is meaningless.
The very notion of miracle is peculiarly demanding in the
realm of metaphysics. If it is to survive the systematic interpretation
of experience then that interpretation must furnish certain minimal
requirements. On the side of ontology there must be provided a
real uniformity in nature. And that uniformity must be objectively
real and necessary, not merely logical. The restrictive, limiting,
necessary relations proper to the causal principle must be resident
in the structure of things. On the side of epistemology there must
be provision for such rapport between subject and object as to
permit knowledge of the true nature of the object. And this knowl
edge must amount, in terms of scientific disciphne with its finite
limitations of time and place, to virtual prediction, not to mere
possibihty or probability. Only if these requirements are met can
miracle have significance. Personahsm does not furnish the
desig
Miracle is not

merely
simply

a

nated minimum.
It is

strange indeed that upon the very principles which pro

vided the foundation for the most extreme forms of naturalism and
skepticism should be erected a venture into Christian
Bowne

metaphysics.

Christian. His tradition has been carried on
by men
of like conviction. But commendable as this is it does not
eclipse
the philosophical short-commgs and,
more, the theological perils of
Bowne's formulation. Before the turn of the
century, his work was
under suspicion; discerning
sensed
the dkection in which
persons
his system would lead. Since that tune the
imphcations of his
thought have reached fuU flower. This unfoldmg has been m the
form of a long display of the endemic radicalism of
was a

personahsm.
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This system has nevertheless been attractive to many who
reject the liberalism which Bowne helped to shape. It has claimed
the distinction of

being

the

naturalism. This claim has

hardly justifiable, in view of the fact that the consistent trend
personalism has been away from Christian supematuralism.

seems

of

major contemporary protest against
yielded a measure of prestige which

